Joachim von Ribbentrops Memoir :: essays research papers

In his prison cell at Nuremberg, Hitlers foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, wrote a brief memoir in the course of which he explored the reasons for Germanys defeat. He picked out(p) three factors that he thought were critical the unexpected power of confrontation of the Red regular army the colossal supply of American armaments and the success of Allied air power. This refinement was Hitlers explanation too. When Ribbentrop spoke with him a week before the suicide in the bunker, Hitler told him that, the real military cause of defeat was the failure of the German Air Force.For the associate in solid ground War Two, the defeat of Germany was their priority.For either his many failings Ribbentrop was side by side(predicate) to the truth than he might have realised. For the Allies in World War Two, the defeat of Germany was their priority. Italy and Japan never posed the same course of threat as the European superpower they fought alongside. Their defeat, costly though i t was, became irresistible. The detect to ending the world crisis was the defeat of Hitlers Germany. This outcome was not pre-ordained, as is so often suggested, once the British Empire was joined by the USSR and the regular army in 1941. The Allies had to mobilise and utilise their large resources effectively on the battlefield and in the air. This outcome could not be taken for granted. British forces were close to defeat everywhere in 1942. The American economy was a peacetime economy, apparently unprepared for the colossal demands of total war. The Soviet system was all but shattered in 1941, two-thirds of its heavy industrial capacity captured and its vast air and tank armies destroyed. This was a war, Ribbentrop ruefully concluded, that Germany could have won.Soviet resistance was in some ways the most surprising outcome. The German attackers believed that Soviet Communism was a corrupt and primitive system that would collapse, in Goebbels talking to like a pack of cards. T he evidence of how poorly the Red Army fought in 1941 confirmed these expectations. More than five million Soviet soldiers were captured or killed in six months they fought with astonishing bravery, but at every level of invade were out-classed by troops that were better armed, better trained and better led.